An Efficient, Generalized Bellman Update For Cooperative Inverse
  Reinforcement Learning by Malik, Dhruv et al.
An Efficient, Generalized Bellman Update For
Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning
Dhruv Malik * 1 Malayandi Palaniappan * 1 Jaime F. Fisac 1 Dylan Hadfield-Menell 1 Stuart Russell 1
Anca D. Dragan 1
Abstract
Our goal is for AI systems to correctly identify
and act according to their human user’s objec-
tives. Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learn-
ing (CIRL) formalizes this value alignment prob-
lem as a two-player game between a human and
robot, in which only the human knows the pa-
rameters of the reward function: the robot needs
to learn them as the interaction unfolds. Previ-
ous work showed that CIRL can be solved as a
POMDP, but with an action space size exponential
in the size of the reward parameter space. In this
work, we exploit a specific property of CIRL—the
human is a full information agent—to derive an
optimality-preserving modification to the standard
Bellman update; this reduces the complexity of
the problem by an exponential factor and allows
us to relax CIRL’s assumption of human rational-
ity. We apply this update to a variety of POMDP
solvers and find that it enables us to scale CIRL to
non-trivial problems, with larger reward parame-
ter spaces, and larger action spaces for both robot
and human. In solutions to these larger problems,
the human exhibits pedagogic (teaching) behavior,
while the robot interprets it as such and attains
higher value for the human.
1. Introduction
As AI agents improve in their ability to optimize for a
given objective, it becomes increasingly important that these
agents pursue the right objective. The value alignment prob-
lem (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016; Bostrom, 2014) is that of
ensuring that robots optimize for what people want—that
robot objectives are aligned with their end-users’ objectives.
(We henceforth use robot to refer generically to an AI agent.)
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Figure 1. A CIRL game. The human H and the robot R need to
work together to prepare a meal. R starts off unaware of which
meal H wants, but both H and R get rewarded only if they prepare
H’s desired meal. Solving such a CIRL game has thus far been
intractable. In Section 3, we derive a modified Bellman update for
computing optimal solutions to CIRL games that achieves an expo-
nential reduction in running time and relaxes CIRL’s assumption
of human rationality.
A highly-capable autonomous agent working towards the
wrong goal can cause undesired effects, the magnitude of
which will tend to increase with the capabilities of the agent.
Unfortunately, we humans have a hard time specifying what
it is that we actually want. For example, customers may
give mistaken instructions to an AI system and system de-
signers may select simple, but potentially incorrect, reward
functions to optimize (Amodei & Clark, 2016). Optimizing
for the wrong objective can lead to unintended and negative
consequences (Amodei et al., 2016).
Rather than optimize a pre-specified reward function, a robot
may instead attempt to infer what people internally want
but cannot perfectly explicate. The robot can use a person’s
actions to learn about the reward function over time. The
most common approach for this is Inverse Reinforcement
Learning (IRL) (Ng & Russell, 2000). IRL makes two
implicit assumptions: 1) that the robot is a passive observer,
watching the human, and 2) that the human acts as an expert
in isolation, ignoring that the robot needs to learn.
Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning (CIRL)
(Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016) relaxes these two assump-
tions. It proposes a formulation in which the humanH and
the robotR are on the same team and collaborate to achieve
the same goal. CIRL is a two-player game betweenH and
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R, in which both take actions, and both get rewarded ac-
cording to the same reward function. The key to CIRL is
that onlyH knows the parameters of this reward function.
Take for instance the domain from Figure 1. H and R
work to prepare a meal using three ingredient types: bread,
meat, and tomatoes. H wants to prepare either a sandwich
(2 bread, 1 meat, 0 tomatoes), or tomato soup (1 bread, 1
meat, 2 tomatoes). R does not know a priori which meal
H wants, and, to emulate the difficulty that people have in
specifying what they want, we assumeH cannot explicate
this information directly toR. At every time step,R andH
each prepare a single unit of any ingredient, or no ingredient
at all. They both receive reward of 1 if they succeed in
preparing the right recipe, and 0 otherwise.
In this domain, CIRL captures that the human has an in-
centive for the robot to infer the correct recipe; and that
the robot can take actions in response to the human’s, as
opposed to passively waiting until it knows which recipe is
right. Crucially, the robot shares the reward function and
has an incentive to maximize the human’s internal reward.
This creates an incentive to mitigate and avoid unintended
consequences from misspecified rewards.
Solving a CIRL game, however, amounts to solving a Dec-
POMDP. Previous work has shown that a CIRL game can
be reduced to a POMDP. However, the action space in this
POMDP is exponential in the size of the reward parameter
space. Since POMDP algorithms scale poorly with the size
of the action space, non-trivial CIRL games remain difficult
to solve with this approach. Additionally, solutions to CIRL
are only optimal under the assumption that the human is
optimal. This is a strong assumption: it is a well-established
fact in cognitive science that humans are often sub-optimal
in decision making (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975; Simon,
1957). Our contributions in this paper are three-fold:
1. A Modified Bellman Update: We exploit the fact that
the human is a full information agent in CIRL to derive an
optimality-preserving modification of the standard Bellman
update. This reduces the complexity of the problem by an
exponential factor. We show how to apply this modification
to existing POMDP solvers (both exact and approximate).
We further show that our modified Bellman update allows us
to relax CIRL’s assumption of human rationality. We instead
only require that the human’s policy be parameterized by
her Q-values. This allows us to solve more realistic CIRL
games where the human is modelled as sub-optimal.
2. Empirical Comparison: We show empirically that our
method helps scale POMDP solvers to CIRL games with
larger reward parameter and action spaces. We find a speed-
up of several orders of magnitude for exact methods, and
substantial improvements in value for approximate methods.
3. Implications: With the ability to solve more complex
CIRL problems, we analyze the solutions that emerge. In
contrast to IRL, we see solutions that exhibit implicit com-
munication. The human takes explicitly suboptimal actions
that are better signals for the right reward, and the robot
attains higher value for the human because it can take ad-
vantage of these signals to learn faster. The coordination
that emerges is a consequence of the human and robot being
on the same team and reasoning about helping each other.
2. Background
2.1. POMDPs
POMDPs provide a rich model for planning under uncer-
tainty (Sondik, 1971; Kaelbling et al., 1998). Formally, a
POMDP is a tuple 〈X,A,Z, T,O, r, γ〉 where X is the set
of states; A is the set of the agent’s actions; Z is the set of
observations; T (xt, at, xt+1) is the transition distribution;
O(xt+1, at, zt+1) is the observation distribution; r is the
reward function; and γ is the discount factor.
Consider a simplified instance of the cooking task from
Figure 1 where H picks her actions according to only her
desired recipe and the quantity of each ingredient prepared
so far, i.e., she does not considerR’s past or future behavior
when picking her actions. The simplified cooking task is
now a POMDP: R is the agent and H is a part of the en-
vironment. The state specifies H’s desired recipe and the
quantity of each ingredient already prepared. Thus,H picks
her actions as a function of only the state.
In a POMDP, the agent cannot observe the state; instead, it
maintains a belief b ∈ ∆X , where b(x) is the probability
that the agent is in state x. At each time step, the agent
receives an observation that helps inform its decisions. The
agent in our cooking task, R, does not know H’s desired
recipe—a component of the state. R observesH’s actions
and tries to infer the desired recipe fromH’s behavior.
The behavior of the agent is specified by a conditional plan
σ = (a, v); a denotes the agent’s action and v is a mapping
from observations to future conditional plans for the agent
to follow. An example conditional plan for R is: prepare
meat now and if H responds by preparing bread, prepare
a second slice of bread; if H prepares tomatoes, prepare
another batch of tomatoes; or if H prepares meat, do not
prepare any ingredient.
The α-vector of a conditional plan contains the value of
following the plan at any given state:
ασ(x) = R(x) + γ
∑
x′∈X
∑
z∈Z
P (x′, z | x, a)αv(z)(x′) (1)
The value of a plan at a belief b is the expected value
of the plan across the states i.e. Vσ(b) = b · ασ =∑
x∈X b(x)ασ(x). The goal of an agent in a POMDP is
to find the plan with maximal value from her current belief.
Value iteration (Sondik, 1971) can be used to compute the
optimal conditional plan. This algorithm starts at the horizon
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and works backwards. It generates new conditional plans
at each time-step and evaluates them according to Eq. 1.
It constructs all potentially optimal plans of length T and
selects the one with maximal value at the initial belief.
2.2. Cooperative Inverse Reinforcement Learning
Now, consider an instance of the cooking task where H
is a second agent in the game and no longer behaves in-
dependently ofR. There is now a strong interdependence
betweenH’s andR’s behavior: H’s actions both depend on
and influenceR’s belief. This problem is now no longer a
POMDP; it is a CIRL game.
A CIRL game is an asymmetric-information two-player
game between a humanH and a robotR (Hadfield-Menell
et al., 2016). H knows the true reward function and R
does not initially. Formally, a CIRL game is a tuple: M =
〈X, {AH ,AR}, T, {Θ, r}, γ〉. X is the set of observable
world-states; AH and AR are the actions available to H
and R respectively; T (xt, aHt , a
R
t , xt+1) is the transition
distribution; Θ is the set of reward parameters; r is the
parameterized reward function shared by both agents; γ is
the discount factor. A solution to a CIRL game is a pair
of policies—one for H and R each—that maximizes the
expected reward obtained byH andR.
In our cooking task, Θ is the set of possible recipes. R does
not knowH’s desired recipe, θ ∈ Θ. The reward function r
is parameterized by Θ: both agents receive a reward of 1 if
they succeed in preparingH’s desired recipe.
Reducing a CIRL game to a POMDP A CIRL game is a
Dec-POMDP (Bernstein et al., 2002) but it can be reduced
to a POMDP where the optimal policy corresponds to opti-
mal CIRL policy pairs (Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016). The
states in this POMDP are tuples of world-state and reward
parameter: S = X × Θ; the actions are tuples (δH , aR)
specifying a decision rule δH : Θ → AH for H, which
maps reward parameters to human actions, and an action aR
forR; the observations areH’s action at the last time step.
An example action in the reduced POMDP of the cooking
task is a tuple, where the first entry specifies thatH prepares
bread if she prefers a sandwich and prepares tomatoes if she
prefers soup, and the second entry specifies thatR prepares
bread (regardless of its belief).
This reduction enables us to solve a CIRL game using
POMDP algorithms. However, the size of the action space in
this POMDP is |AH ||Θ||AR|, as shown in Figure 2. (There
are |AH ||Θ| possible decision rules forH and |AR| actions
for R.) In other words, the action space in this POMDP
grows exponentially with the size of the reward parameter
space. Exact POMDP algorithms are exponential in the size
of the action space, so this approach can only be applied to
very small CIRL problems.
Additionally, the policy forR that is output by the reduced
;
;
}⇤
Figure 2. A node in the search tree from the POMDP reduction
of our example CIRL game. Actions are tuples that contain an
action for R and a decision rule for H – a mapping from her
desired recipe to an action. This leads to a branching factor of
|AH ||Θ||AR| and makes application of POMDP methods ineffi-
cient. In Section 3.2, we derive a modified Bellman update that
prunes away all of H’s decision rules but the optimal response. (In
the diagram, the gray branches are pruned away by our modified
Bellman update.)
POMDP is optimal only ifH is perfectly rational, i.e., ifH
is guaranteed to always pick the optimal action. This is an
unrealistic assumption: humans are not idealized rational
agents (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975; Simon, 1957).
3. A Modified Bellman Update for CIRL
If H were following a fixed policy based on the state
s = (x, θ), we could encode H as a part of the environ-
ment. However, in the interactive setting of a CIRL game,
H may plan for changes in R’s belief. If we encodeH in
the environment, the dynamics change in response to R’s
intended plan and the problem is no longer a POMDP. Our
main contribution is to derive a modified Bellman update
for POMDP algorithms to solve this problem.
Our key idea is as follows. During planning, we knowR’s
intended future response to each ofH’s actions. H has full
state information, so the α-vectors in value iteration allow
us to directly computeH’s Q-values. We can therefore also
compute her optimal action based on R’s intended future
response. This means we do not have to reason over the
set of decision rules for H: we can solve a CIRL game
by instead solving a POMDP with time-varying dynamics
and, importantly, where the action space has size |AR|.
This is exponentially smaller than the action space of size
|AH ||Θ||AR| in the reduced POMDP. This amounts to a
modified Bellman update.
3.1. The Transition Dynamics
If H follows a policy that depends only on the state s =
(x, θ), the dynamics of the game can be computed as:
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P (s′, aH | s, aR) = P ((x′, θ′), aH | (x, θ), aR)
= P ((x′, θ′) | (x, θ), aH , aR) · P (aH | (x, θ), aR)
= T (x, aH , aR, x′) · 1(θ = θ′) · P (aH | x, aR, θ)
a.
= T (s, aH , aR, s′) · P (aH | x, aR, θ)
However, in the CIRL formulation,H does not behave ac-
cording to a fixed policy. H, who is assumed to be rational,
behaves according to her Q-values and picks the action that
maximizes her expected value. Due to the interdependence
betweenH’s andR’s behavior, these Q-values depend on
R’s conditional plan. The dynamics then are:
P (s′, aH | s, σ) = P ((x′, θ′), aH | (x, θ), (aR, v))
= T (x, aH , aR, x′) · 1(θ′ = θ) · P (aH | x, aR, v, θ)
= T (s, aH , aR, s′) · 1(aH = arg max
aH
QH(s, a
H , σ))
(2)
These dynamics change over time since they depend on the
robot’s future behavior. However,R’s behavior depends on
these dynamics, so, we cannot pre-compute them as part of
a POMDP reduction. However, we do have access to R’s
future conditional plan during planning. This means we can
compute H’s Q-values, and, consequently, the transition
probabilities, with a modification to the Bellman update.
3.2. Adapting POMDP Value Iteration
POMDP value iteration rolls back the values of the game
from the horizon, storing them as α-vectors. IfR follows a
plan σ = (aR, v), then we can computeH’s Q-values as
QH(s, a
H , σ) =
∑
s′
T (s, aH , aR, s′) · αv(aH)(s′).
H’s optimal action maximizes this expression. To leverage
this, we adapt the Bellman update in Eq. 1 to replace the
dynamics of the game with P (s′, aH | s, σ) from Eq. 2.
The modified Bellman update is then:
ασ(s) = R(s) + γ ·max
aH
∑
s′∈S
T (s, aH , aR, s′) · αv(aH)(s′).
(3)
We can then use value iteration with this modified Bellman
update to compute the R’s optimal policy. The following
theorem establishes that the modified Bellman update, Eq.
3, is optimality-preserving.
Theorem 1. For any CIRL game, the policy computed by
value iteration with the modified Bellman update is optimal.
All theorem proofs are presented in Appendix A.
a. We let T (s, aH , aR, s′) = T (x, aH , aR, x′) · 1(θ = θ′).
This modification to the Bellman update allows us to solve
a CIRL game without having to include the set ofH’s de-
cision rules in the action space. As depicted in Figure 2,
the modified Bellman update computesH’s optimal action
given the current state and the robot’s plan; all ofH’s other
actions are pruned away in the search tree. The size of the
action space is then |AR| instead of |AH ||Θ||AR|. POMDP
algorithms are exponential in the size of the action space;
this modification therefore allows us to solve CIRL games
much more efficiently. The following theorem establishes
the complexity gains made by algorithm.
Theorem 2. The modification to the Bellman update pre-
sented above reduces the time and space complexity of a
single step of value iteration by a factor of O (|AH ||Θ|).
3.3. Relaxing CIRL’s Assumption of Rationality
To achieve value alignment, we can now efficiently solve a
CIRL game to find an optimal policy forR. However, this
policy is optimal only if H is perfectly rational: a strong
assumption. This is rarely true in reality; we thus want to
find an optimal policy forR even whenH is sub-optimal.
In addition to improving efficiency, our modified Bellman
update allows us to do exactly that and relax CIRL’s assump-
tion of rationality. The dynamics of our modified Bellman
update, presented above as Eq. 2, do not require thatH is
perfectly rational. These dynamics will remain well-defined
so long as we know the distribution overH’s actions, piH ,
and can compute the probability that she picks any action
from her current state. To avoid compromising the interac-
tive nature of CIRL, we require that piH must be a function
of H’s Q-values, which account for the robot’s future be-
havior. The dynamics of the game are then given by:
P (s′, aH | s, σ) = T (s, aH , aR, s′)·piH(aH | QH(s, aH , σ)).
The modified Bellman update is then:
ασ(s) = R(s) + γ ·
∑
aH
piH(a
H | QH(s, aH , σ))·∑
s′∈S
T (s, aH , aR, s′) · αv(aH)(s′). (4)
With this modified Bellman update, we may now use value
iteration to solve CIRL games without assuming that the
human is perfectly rational. We instead only require that
the human selects her actions with respect to her Q-values.
This restriction is rather broad and includes a variety of
models of human decision making from cognitive science.
A popular example of such a model is Boltzmann-rationality,
where the human picks her actions according to a Boltzmann
distribution over her Q-values, i.e.,
piH(a
H | QH(s, aH , σ)) ∝ exp(β ·QH(s, aH , σ))
where β is a parameter which controls how rational the hu-
man is. (A higher β corresponds to a more rational human.)
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Algorithm 1 Adapted Value Iteration for CIRL Games
1: Γt ← Set of trivial plans
2: for t ∈ {T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, 0} do
3: Γt+1 ← Γt
4: Γt ← Set of all plans beginning at time t
5: for σ ∈ Γt do
6: for s = (x, θ) ∈ S do
7: QH(s, aH , σ) =
∑
s′ T (s, a
H , aR, s′)·
8: αv(aH)(s
′)
9: ασ(s) = R(s) + γ ·
∑
aH
10: piH(aH | QH(s, aH , σ)) ·QH(s, aH , σ)
11: end for
12: end for
13: Γt ← Prune(Γt)
14: end for
15: aR∗ = argmaxσ∈Γ0ασ · b0
16: Return aR∗
The time and space complexity of value iteration with this
Bellman update is identical to that with the modified Bell-
man update presented in Section 3.2, and analyzed in The-
orem 2. The pseudocode for our adapted algorithm is pre-
sented as Algorithm 1 below.
4. Adapting Approximate Algorithms
Approximate algorithms for POMDPs often rely on variants
of the Bellman update. This lets us use our modified Bell-
man update to improve approximate algorithms for CIRL.
4.1. PBVI
Background Point Based Value Iteration (PBVI) is an ap-
proximate algorithm used to solve POMDPs (Pineau et al.,
2003). The algorithm maintains a representative set of
points in belief space and an α-vector at each of these belief
points. It performs approximate value backups at each of
these belief points using this set of α-vectors. Let Γt+1
denote the set of α-vectors for plans that begin at time t+ 1.
The value at time t at a belief b is approximated as:
V (b) = max
a∈A
[∑
s∈S
R(s)b(s)
+ γ
∑
o∈O
max
α∈Γt+1
∑
s∈S
(∑
s′∈S
P (s′, o | s, a)α(s)
)
b(s)
]
.
The algorithm trades off computation time and solution
quality by expanding the set of belief points over time: it
randomly simulates forward trajectories in the POMDP to
produce new, reachable beliefs.
Our Adaptation IfR takes action aR and follows a condi-
tional plan σ, then H’s Q-values are QH(x, aH , aR, α) =∑
s′ T (s, a
H , aR, s′) · ασ(s′). Notice that we can compute
these Q-values at each step of PBVI. This lets us use the
modified Bellman update and to adapt PBVI to solve CIRL
games specifically. We replace the transition-observation
distribution in the PBVI backup rule with
P (s′, aH | s, aR, α) = T (s, aH , aR, s′)·
piH(QH(x, a
H , aR, α)).
The modified backup rule for PBVI is thus given by
V (b) = max
aR∈AR
[∑
s∈S
R(s)b(s)
+γ
∑
aH
max
α∈Γt+1
∑
s∈S
(∑
s′∈S
P (s′, aH | s, aR, α)α(s)
)
b(s)
]
.
We now show that the approximate value function in PBVI
converges to the true value function. Let B denote the
density of the set of belief points B in PBVI. Formally,
B = maxb∈∆ minb′∈B ||b− b′||1 is the maximum distance
from any reachable, legal belief to the set B.
Theorem 3. For any belief setB and horizon n, the error of
our adapted PBVI algorithm η = ||Vn − V ∗n ||∞ is bounded
as
η ≤ (Rmax −Rmin)B
(1− γ)2 .
4.2. POMCP
Background POMCP is a Monte Carlo tree-search (MCTS)
based approximate algorithm for solving large POMDPs
(Silver & Veness, 2010). The algorithm constructs a search
tree of action-observation histories and uses Monte Carlo
simulations to estimate the value of each node in the tree.
During search, actions within the tree are selected by UCB1.
This maintains a balance between exploiting actions known
to have good return and exploring actions not yet taken
(Kocsis & Szepesva´ri, 2006). At leaf nodes, a rollout policy
accrues reward which is then backed up through the tree.
The algorithm estimates the belief at each node by keeping
track of the hidden state from previous rollouts.
POMCP scales well with the size of the state space, but
not with the size of the action space, which determines the
branching factor in the search tree. POMCP is thus ill-suited
to solving the reduced POMDP of CIRL games since the
size of the action space is |AH ||Θ||AR|.
Our Adaptation Using the idea behind our modified Bell-
man update, we adapt POMCP to solve CIRL games more
efficiently. We approximateH’s policy while running the
algorithm (much like we exactly compute H’s policy in
exact value iteration). We maintain a live estimate of the
sampled Q-values forH at each node. With enough explo-
ration of the search tree (for instance, if actions are selected
using UCB1), the estimated Q-values converge to the true
values (in the limit). This guarantees that H’s policy con-
verges to her true policy. The following result establishes
convergence of our algorithm.
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Theorem 4. With suitable exploration, the value func-
tion constructed by our adapted POMCP algorithm
converges in probability to the optimal value function,
V (h)→ V ∗(h). As the number of visits N(h) approaches
infinity, the bias of the value function E[V (h)− V ∗(h)] is
O(log(N(h))/N(h)).
The pseudocode for our adapted PBVI and our adapted
POMCP algorithm is presented as Algorithm 1 and 2 respec-
tively in Appendix B.
5. Related Work
POMDP Algorithms We chose to explicate our modified
Bellman update in the context of PBVI and POMCP because
they are the seminal point-based and MCTS algorithms
respectively, for solving POMDPs. For example, SARSOP
(Kurniawati et al., 2008) and DESPOT (Ye et al., 2017),
two state-of-the-art algorithm for POMDPs, are variants of
PBVI and POMCP respectively. The principles we outlined
in Sections 3 and 4 can be easily adapted to a large variety
of point-based and MCTS algorithms, including any which
may be developed in the future, to derive even more efficient
algorithms for solving CIRL games.
MOMDP Algorithms The POMDP representation of CIRL
is also a mixed-observability Markov decision process
(MOMDP) since the state space can be factored into a fully-
and a partially-observable component. This structure allows
for more efficient solution methods; Ong et al. (2010) lever-
age the factored nature of the state space to create a lower
dimensional representation of belief space. This core idea
is orthogonal to ours, which exploits CIRL’s information
asymmetry instead. The two can be leveraged together.
Dec-POMDP Algorithms Dec-POMDP algorithms can be
used to solve CIRL directly, without using the POMDP re-
duction. These solution methods are generally intractable,
but recent work has made progress on this front. Such
Dec-POMDP algorithms which attempt to prune away un-
reasonable strategies resemble our approach. Amato et al.
(2009) use reachability analysis to identify reachable states,
then consider all policies which are useful at such states.
Hansen (2004) model other agents possible strategies as
part of a players belief, and prune away weakly dominated
strategies at each step. While such approaches use heuris-
tics to prune away some suboptimal strategies, we leverage
the information structure of CIRL to compute the optimal
strategy for H and prune away all other strategies. This
guarantees an exponential reduction in complexity while
preserving optimality; this is not true for the other methods.
Value Alignment Recent work has explored relaxing the
rationality requirement of CIRL (Fisac et al., 2017). Our
work improves on their relaxation in several ways: (1) Their
Bellman update assumes that the human acts Boltzmann-
rationally. Our modification can model a large variety of
Table 1. Time taken (s) to find the optimal robot policy using exact
VI and our adaptation of it for various numbers of possible recipes.
NA denotes that the algorithm failed to solve the problem.
# RECIPES EXACT VI OURS
2 4.448 ± 0.057 0.071 ± 0.013
3 394.546 ± 6.396 0.111 ± 0.013
4 NA 0.158 ± 0.003
5 NA 0.219 ± 0.007
6 NA 0.307 ± 0.005
human behaviors (including this). (2) Their discretized
belief value iteration algorithm has neither the guarantee of
optimality of our adapted VI algorithm nor the scalability
of our adapted POMCP/PBVI algorithms.
6. Experiments
We now verify that our modified Bellman update allows
POMDP algorithms to solve CIRL games more efficiently
than the standard update. We ran three experiments: one for
exact value iteration (VI), PBVI, and POMCP each. The
results of the PBVI experiment are presented in Appendix
C.1 due to space constraints. To verify the results of our ex-
periments, we ran further experiments on a second domain.
The details and results of these experiments are presented
in Appendix C.2.
6.1. Experimental Design
Domain Our experimental domain is based on our running
example from Section 1. Assume there are m recipes and n
ingredients. The state space is an n-tuple representing the
quantity of each ingredient prepared thus far. At each time
step, each agent can prepare any of the n ingredients or none
at all. Each of the m recipes corresponds to a different θ (i.e.
reward parameter) value. Both agents receive a reward of 1
ifH’s desired recipe is prepared correctly and a reward of 0
otherwise. The robotR begins the game entirely uncertain
aboutH’s desired recipe i.e. R has a uniform belief over Θ.
We want to stress that this experimental domain is not trivial:
one of the domains we managed to solve in our experiments
had ∼ 1010 states.
Manipulated Variables Our primary variable is the type of
Bellman update used: modified vs. standard. We also varied
the number of recipes, i.e., size of the reward parameter
space, and the number of ingredients, i.e., size ofH’s and
R’s action space.
Dependent Measures In our first experiment (exact VI),
we measured the time taken by the algorithms to solve the
problem. In our second experiment (PBVI), we measured
the value attained by the algorithms in a fixed time. In our
third experiment (POMCP), we measured the value attained
by the algorithms in a fixed number of samples.
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Figure 3. (Left) The value attained by POMCP, FV-POMCP, and our adapted algorithm in 30,000 samples with various numbers of
ingredients. (Right) Value attained by POMCP, FV-POMCP and our approximate algorithm with 2 recipes and 6 ingredients.
Hypothesis POMDP algorithms are more efficient at solv-
ing CIRL games with the modified Bellman update than with
the standard Bellman update.
6.2. Analysis
Exact VI In our first experiment, we compared the time
taken by exact VI and by our adaptation of it with the modi-
fied Bellman update. We first fixed the number of ingredi-
ents at two and varied the number of recipes in the domain.
Table 1 compares the results. For the simpler problems,
where the number of recipes was 2 or 3, our adapted algo-
rithm solved the problem up to∼3500× faster than exact VI.
On more complex problems where the number of recipes is
greater than 3, exact VI failed to solve the problem after de-
pleting our system’s 16GB memory; in contrast, our adapted
algorithm solved each of these more complex problems in
less than 0.5 seconds. We next fixed the number of recipes
and compared the performance of both these algorithms for
various numbers of ingredients. Both the exact methods,
but especially the one using the standard Bellman update,
scaled much worse with the number of ingredients than with
the number of recipes. With even three ingredients, exact VI
timed out and failed to solve the problem within two hours;
our algorithm however solved the problem in five seconds.
POMCP We compared the value attained in 30,000 samples
by POMCP and by our adaptation with the modified Bell-
man update. We additionally compared these algorithms
with FV-POMCP, a state-of-the-art MCTS method for solv-
ing MPOMDPs, a type of Dec-POMDP in which all agents
can observe each others’ behavior (as in CIRL).
We first fixed the number of recipes at 2 and varied the num-
ber of ingredients. Our adapted algorithm outperformed the
other two algorithms across the board, especially for large
numbers of ingredients. The results of this comparison are
presented in Figure 3 (left). POMCP did poorly on games
with more than 4 ingredients. Although FV-POMCP scaled
better to more complex games than POMCP, its values had
high variance. For the largest games, with 6 and 7 ingre-
dients, our adapted algorithm was the only one capable of
solving the problem in 30,000 iterations. We also compared
the value attained by each algorithm across 500,000 samples
on the 6 ingredient game. The results of this comparison are
depicted in Figure 3 (right). Our algorithm converged to the
true value faster than either of the other algorithms.
We next fixed the number of ingredients at 4 and varied
the number of recipes. We found that the results of this
experiment broadly matched the results of our previous
experiment where we varied the number of ingredients. For
example, with 4 recipes, our method achieves an average
value of 0.631± 0.221 in 30,000 iterations while POMCP
gets 0.429± 0.183 and FV-POMCP gets 0.511± 0.124.
These results together demonstrate that POMDP algorithms
with our modified Bellman update scales much better to
more complex CIRL games than with the standard Bellman
update. This offers strong evidence for our hypothesis.
7. Discussion
The previous section showed that we can now solve larger,
non-trivial CIRL games. While we are still far from address-
ing value alignment in the high dimensional and continuous
real world, our work allows us to analyze CIRL solutions to
non-trivial problems and understand their implications for
value alignment.
7.1. CIRL vs IRL
In the absence of CIRL solutions, a standard approach to
learning the human’s internal reward is Inverse Reinforce-
ment Learning (IRL) (Ng & Russell, 2000). We thus com-
pare what advantages CIRL has compared to IRL. On a
collaborative task, IRL is equivalent to assuming that H
chooses her actions in isolation, andR uses observations of
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Figure 4. Value attained by CIRL and standard IRL on the cooking
domain with various numbers of possible recipes. Unlike IRL,
CIRL produces solutions whereH picks her actions pedagogically
andR reasons aboutH accordingly.
her behavior to infer her preferences. Specifically,H solves
a single-agent, fully-observable, variant of the problem, and
R responds by solving the POMDP described in Section 2.
We fix the number of ingredients at 3 and vary the number
of recipes. Figure 4 shows the results. In each experiment
the optimal CIRL solution prepares the correct recipe while
the IRL solution fails to do so up to 50% of the time. To
understand the nature of this difference in performance, we
analyze the CIRL and IRL solutions. Consider a case of
our running example with two recipes. The state is a tuple
(#meat,#bread,#tomatoes) and Θ = {sandwich =
(1, 2, 0), soup = (1, 1, 2)}. For both approaches,R initially
prepares meat. In the baseline IRL solution,H can initially
make any ingredient if she wants soup and can make meat
or bread if she wants a sandwich. In each case, she chooses
uniformly at random between allowed ingredients. This
conveys some information about her desired recipe, but is
not enough to uniquely identify it. Since the same ingredient
is optimal for multiple recipes,R is still confused after one
turn. This means R will sometimes fail to complete the
desired recipe, reducing average utility.
The CIRL solution, in contrast, relies on the implicit commu-
nication between the human and the robot. Here, ifH wants
soup, she prepares tomatoes, as opposed to any ingredients
that are common with the sandwich. Even more interest-
ingly, she waits (i.e. does nothing) if she wants a sandwich.
This is pure signaling behavior—waiting is suboptimal in
isolation, but picking an ingredient is more likely to con-
fuse the robot. In turnR knows thatH would have picked
tomatoes if she wanted soup, and responds appropriately.
In other words,H teaches the robot about her preferences
with her action selection. This works becauseH knows that
R will interpret her behavior pragmatically, i.e.,R expects
to be taught byH. This is reflected in the experiment: the
optimal CIRL solution prepares the correct recipe each time.
The value alignment problem is necessarily cooperative:
without the robot, the human is unable to complete her de-
sired task, and without explicit signaling from the human,
the robot learns inefficiently, is less valuable and is more
likely to make a mistake. Pedagogic behavior fromH natu-
rally falls out of the CIRL solution. In response,R interprets
H’s actions pragmatically. These instructive and commu-
nicative behaviors allow for faster learning and create an
opportunity to generate higher value for the human.
7.2. CIRL with Suboptimal Humans
To further investigate the performance of CIRL in realistic
settings (e.g., where H may not be rational), we ran an-
other experiment. We varied whetherH behaved according
to CIRL or IRL, R’s model of H in training (rational or
Boltzmann-rational), and the actual model of H (same as
previous). We measured the proportion of times they pre-
pared the correct recipe in each setting, fixing the number
of ingredients at 3 and recipes at 4. Figure 6 in Appendix
D shows the results. (We also conducted a more compre-
hensive experiment with 20 human behaviors instead of 2.
Results are presented in Appendix E.)
Averaged across different models of H used to train R,
whenH behaved according to CIRL,H andR succeeded
in preparing the correct recipe > 90% of the time. This
was also true whenH behaved Boltzmann-rationally. This
suggests that the pedagogic behavior that arises from CIRL
makes it more robust to any sub-optimality from H. In
contrast, whenH behaved as in IRL (i.e., not pedagogically),
they only prepared the correct recipe ∼70% of the time
whenH was rational, and ∼40% of the time whenH was
not. So, the importance of pedagogic behavior from H to
achieve value alignment is clear.
7.3. Do People Behave Pedagogically?
A question arises at this point as to whether real people
will adopt the pedagogic behavior predicted by CIRL solu-
tions. To start testing this, we ran a (very preliminary) pilot
study to start investigating whether CIRL improves interac-
tions with real people. The details of this experiment are
presented in Appendix F. We found some encouraging evi-
dence that suggests people do indeed behave pedagogically
when collaborating with a robot; and that a CIRL-trained
robot is can be better at exploiting this pedagogic behavior to
achieve fluid human-robot collaboration than an IRL-trained
robot.
In future work, we plan to conduct a more extensive human
subjects study to validate these preliminary findings. We
additionally plan to explore techniques to make the robot
better elicit pedagogic behavior from the human in their
interaction and to make CIRL robust to variations in human
behavior.
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Appendix
A. Proofs
In this section, we present the proofs for the propositions
and theorems in the main paper.
Theorem 1. For any CIRL game, the policy computed by
value iteration with the modified Bellman update is optimal.
Proof. During POMDP value iteration, values are propa-
gated from the horizon in the form of α vectors, which store
the expected values of executing a conditonal plan from
each state. In CIRL games, H is a full information actor,
which means she has knowledge of her true reward param-
eter θ. So, given R’s conditional plan, she can directly
compute her Q values from the α vectors. The presence
of the inner max in our modified update rule ensures that
H always picks the action corresponding to her maximum
Q value. This implies that at every backup step, our modi-
fied Bellman update never prunes away the optimal action.
Hence, the output policy, which is the best policy among
those not pruned away, must be optimal.
Theorem 2. The modification to the Bellman update pre-
sented above reduces the time and space complexity of a
single step of value iteration by a factor of O (|AH ||Θ|).
Proof. The complexity of one step of POMDP value iter-
ation is linear in the size of the action space, |A| (Russell
& Norvig, 1995). Since the structure of our algorithm is
identical to that of exact value iteration, this is also true for
our algorithm.
The action space in the POMDP reduction of CIRL has
size |AH ||Θ||AR|. Our modification to the Bellman up-
date reduces the size of the action space to simply |AR|.
Therefore, our algorithm reduces the time taken to run, and
number of plans generated at, each time step by a factor of
|AH ||Θ|.
Theorem 3. For any belief set B and horizon n, the error of
our adapted PBVI algorithm η = ||Vn − V ∗n ||∞ is bounded
as
η ≤ (Rmax −Rmin)B
(1− γ)2 .
Proof. Since the dynamics of our problem are now time-
varying instead of static, the backup operator applied at
every time-step changes. Let Ht denote the backup operator
applied to compute the value of Vt. It will suffice to show
that each such backup operator Ht is a contraction mapping.
The result then follows by following the proof of Theorem 1
in (Pineau et al., 2003) exactly. We will prove the result by
showing that each Ht is the backup operator for a specific
POMDP and thus, for this POMDP’s corresponding belief
MDP; it must therefore be a contraction mapping.
Take Ht for some 1 ≤ t ≤ n. We will now construct a
new POMDP for which Ht is the backup operator. Let Sˆ =
S×Γt+1, where Γt+1 denotes the set of α-vectors from our
original problem at time t+ 1. Let the α-vector component
of the state be static i.e. P ((s′, α′) | (s, α), aR) = 0 if
α 6= α′. The action and observation spaces remain as
they are in our original problem. The transition-observation
distribution, given in Eqn. (3), is now time-invariant: we do
not need to look forward in the search tree to compute the
Q-values since the α-vectors are available in the state space.
Hence, this POMDP is well-defined.
The dynamics of the POMDP are static and identical to
the dynamics of our problem at time t. Thus, the backup
operatorHt is the backup operator for this POMDP and also
for this POMDP’s corresponding belief MDP. Therefore, the
backup operator Ht must be a contraction mapping.
Theorem 4. With suitable exploration, the value func-
tion constructed by our adapted POMCP algorithm con-
verges in probability to the optimal value function, V (h)→
V ∗(h). As the number of visits N(h) approaches infin-
ity, the bias of the value function E[V (h) − V ∗(h)] is
O(log(N(h))/N(h)).
Proof. We will show that with enough exploration, in the
limit of infinite samples, we have a well defined POMDP.
The result then follows from Theorem 1 in (Silver & Veness,
2010).
The human action nodes in the search tree maintain an array
of values, which store the values of picking that action for
different θ. At any point in the search tree, the human ac-
tions (like the robot actions) are selected by picking the one
that has the maximum augmented value (current estimated
value plus exploration bonus). So, in the limit of infinite
samples, each human action node is visited infinitely many
times and the value estimates at the nodes converge to the
true Q values. Having the correct human Q values gives us a
POMDP, with well defined transition-observation dynamics.
The result then follows from applying the analysis given in
Theorem 1 of (Silver & Veness, 2010) to this POMDP.
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B. Pseudocode
The pseudocode for adapted PBVI is presented below. The
algorithm follows a similar structure to the standard PBVI al-
gorithm (Pineau et al., 2003). The main difference between
our adapted algorithm and the standard PBVI algorithm is
that ours uses the modified Bellman update instead of the
standard one. See lines 15-16.
The pseudocode for adapted POMCP is also presented be-
low, similar in style to that presented in (Silver & Veness,
2010). The key difference is that we maintain a live estimate
of the sampled Q-values forH at each node. We maintain ar-
rays which store the estimated values of taking each human
action for different θ. The optimal human action is selected
with regard to these estimates. Like the robot actions, the
human actions are selected while balancing exploration and
exploitation. Rollouts use random action selection.
Algorithm 2 Adapted PBVI for CIRL Games
1: function PBVI (b0, T )
2: B ← {b0}
3: V ← Set of α-vectors belonging to trivial plans
4: repeat
5: for t ∈ {T − 1, T − 2, . . . , 1, 0} do
6: V ← Backup(B, V )
7: end for
8: B ← Expand(B, V )
9: until maxα∈V α · b0 ≥ Vtarget
10: Return V
11: end function
12: function Backup (B, V ′)
13: V ← {}
14: for aR ∈ AR do
15: for α′i ∈ V ′ do
16: for s ∈ S do
17: QH(s, aH) =
∑
s′ T (s, a
H , aR, s′)·
18: αv(aH)(s
′)
19: end for
20: Γa
R ← αi(s) = r(s) + γ·
21:
∑
aH piH(a
H | QH(s, aH))·
22:
∑
s′ P (s
′, aH | s, aR, α′i) · αi(s′)
23: end for
24: end for
25: for b ∈ B do
26: Vb ← {}
27: for aR ∈ AR do
28: Vb ← argmaxα∈ΓaRα · b
29: end for
30: V ← argmaxα∈Γbα · b
31: end for
32: Return V
33: end function
34: function Expand (B′, V ′)
35: B ← B′
36: for b, α ∈ B′, V ′ do
37: Bb ← {}
38: for aR ∈ AR do
39: s ∼ b(s)
40: aH ∼ P (aH | s, aR, α)
41: b′(s′) = η
∑
s P (s
′, aH | s, aR, α)b(s)
42: where η is the normalizing constant
43: Bb ← Bb ∪ b′
44: end for
45: B ← B ∪ argmax||b− b′||1,∀b ∈ Bb, b′ ∈ B′
46: end for
47: Return B
48: end function
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Algorithm 3 Adapted POMCP for CIRL games
1: function Search (h)
2: repeat
3: if h = empty then
4: s ∼ I
5: else
6: s ∼ B(h)
7: end if
8: SIMULATE(s, h, 0)
9: until TIMEOUT()
10: Return argmaxaRV (haR)
11: end function
12: function Rollout (s, h, depth)
13: if γdepth <  then
14: Return 0
15: end if
16: aR, aH ∼ Uniform(AR), Uniform(AH)
17: s′ ∼ T (s, aR, aH)
18: Return r(s) + γ ·ROLLOUT(s′, haRaH , depth+ 1)
19: end function
20: function Simulate (s, h, depth)
21: if γdepth <  then
22: Return 0
23: end if
24: if h /∈ T then
25: Return ROLLOUT(s, h, depth)
26: end if
27: aR ← argmaxaRV (haR) + c
√
logN(h)
N(haR)
28: θ ← sθ
29: aH ← SAMPLEHUMANACTION(θ, h, aR)
30: s′ ∼ T (s, aR, aH)
31: R← r(s) + γ · SIMULATE(s′, haRaH , depth+ 1)
32: B(h)← B(h) ∪ {s}
33: N(h)← N(h) + 1
34: N(haR)← N(haR) + 1
35: N(haRaH)← N(haRaH) + 1
36: V (haR)← V (haR) + R−V (haR)
N(haR)
37: Vθ(haRaH)← Vθ(haRaH) + R−Vθ(ha
RaH)
Nθ(haRaH)
38: Return R
39: end function
40: function SampleHumanAction (θ, h, aR)
41: aH ∼ piH
(
aH | Vθ(haRaH) + c
√
logNθ(haR)
Nθ(haRaH)
)
42: Return aH
43: end function
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C. Additional Experiments Omitted in
Section 5
C.1. PBVI Experiment on Cooking Domain
Figure 5. Value attained by PBVI and our approximate algorithm
for various numbers of ingredients. (For the first 3 data points, the
values attained by both methods were the same – we jittered the
plot slightly for visibility).
In our second of the three experiments conducted in Section
5, we compared the values attained by PBVI and our adap-
tation, with one hour of computation time. We first fixed
the number of recipes and varied the number of ingredients.
The results of this experiment are presented in Figure 5. We
found that both these algorithms, but especially our adapted
algorithm, scaled much better with the number of ingredi-
ents than their exact VI counterparts. For simpler games,
with 3 and 4 ingredients, both algorithms attained the max-
imal value of 0.9025. However, with 5 ingredients, PBVI
found a value of 0 in an hour. In contrast, our algorithm
easily solved the game with 5, 6, and 7 ingredients, attaining
the maximal value of 0.9025. We next fixed the number of
ingredients and varied the number of recipes. Again, our
adapted algorithm outperformed PBVI. For example, with
4 recipes, our adapted method attains a value of 0.67875
while the standard PBVI method attains a value of 0.45125.
These results suggest that our modified Bellman update
allows PBVI to scale to larger CIRL games, especially in
terms of the size ofH’s andR’s action space. This offers
further support to our hypothesis.
C.2. Experiment on RockSample Domain
C.2.1. DOMAIN
The second benchmark CIRL domain we present is an exten-
sion of the POMDP benchmark domain RockSample, that
models Mars-rover exploration (Smith & Simmons, 2004).
Consider a collaborative task where a human H wants to
take samples of some rocks from Mars, with the help of
a rover R deployed on Mars. There are some number of
hours during the day (working hours) whenH can control
R herself but for the rest of the day, R has to behave au-
tonomously. Not all types of rocks are of equal scientific
value;H knows the value of each of these rocks butR does
not. (Once again, we assume thatH cannot communicate
these values toR directly.)
Formally, consider an instance of RockSample on a m×m
grid, with n rocks, each of which belong to one of k different
types. The state space is a cross-product of the x- and y-
coordinate of R with n binary features IsSampledi =
{Y es,No}, which indicate which of the rocks have already
been sampled. (Each rock can only be sampled once.)
RockSample is a turn-based game: R may first take lR
steps in any of the four cardinal direction (during those
hours when it is running autonomously) after whichH may
similarly take lH steps (during the remaining hours). Thus,
the set of actions available toH is the set of all trajectories
of length exactly lH while that available toR is the set of
all trajectories with length at most lR. (R may wait on any
specific step if it requires more information while H may
not wait since she has all the information required.)
The set of all reward parameters Θ is composed of a collec-
tion of k-dimensional vectors, where the ith entry represents
the reward received for sampling rock i. Both agents receive
the reward specified by the true reward parameter θ when
they sample a rock and receive no reward for any other
action.
C.2.2. DETAILS OF EXPERIMENT
We repeat the experiment from Section 5.1 of the main paper
on this new domain, with a 5× 5 grid (m = 5), 3 types of
rocks (k = 4), and 4 rocks total (n = 4).
This domain is much more complex than the cooking do-
main. For example, note that for even the simplest iteration
of this domain, with lH = lR = 1, |AH | = 4 and |AR = 5|
(sinceR can also choose to wait); if we raise lR slightly to
2, we have |AR = 13|. Hence, we only ran our experiments
with POMCP, which scales the best of the three types of the
algorithms.
We found similar results to that of Section 5.2 of the main pa-
per. For any value of lR beyond 1, FV-POMCP and POMCP
fail to solve the problem; the branching factor of the search
tree they both construct is too large and thus, both methods
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deplete the 16GB of memory in our system almost immedi-
ately. Our method however manages to scale to larger values
of lH and lR with relative ease; our method successfully
computed the optimal policy for this domain with values of
lH = lR = 2 within two hours of computation.
D. Additional Figure from Section 6.2
Figure 6 describes the results from the experiment in Section
6.2 of the main paper. In this experiment, we analyzed the
performance of CIRL and IRL on our collaborative domain
when the human does not behave rationally (and when the
robot may or may not be aware of this fact).
Figure 6. The proportion of times thatH andR prepared the cor-
rect recipe on the cooking domain when R is trained with, and
H actually behaves according to, a variety of different behaviors.
They were significantly more successful at preparing the correct
recipe whenH behaved pedagogically according to CIRL.
E. Results of Follow-up Experiment to
Section 6.2
The manipulated variables and dependent measures are ex-
actly as in Section 6.2, with the sole exception being that we
considered 10 possible human policies instead of 2. The 10
policies were chosen from a 5× 2 factorial of the human’s
behavior and presence of bias. The 5 possible behaviors
were rational, Boltzmann-rational with β = 1, Boltzmann-
ration with β = 5, -greedy with  = 0.1, -greedy with
 = 0.01. The 2 possible levels for presence of bias were
”No Bias” and ”Bias”, where ”Bias” denoted thatH had a
systematic preference for choosing the ”Wait” action. (In
our setting, H received a reward of 0.25 every time she
chose the ”Wait” action.)
The results of our experiment are presented below in Fig-
ure 7 as a heat map. Much like the simpler experiment
in Section 7.2 of the main paper, we find that H and R
are much more successful whenH behaves pedagogically
and that in the presence of pedagogic behavior, the team’s
performance is more robust to any sub-optimality fromH.
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Figure 7. The proportion of times thatH andR prepared the correct recipe on the cooking domain with 3 ingredients and 4 recipes when
R is trained with, and H actually behaves according to, a variety of different behaviors. They were significantly more successful at
preparing the correct recipe whenH behaved pedagogically by following a policy specified by CIRL.
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F. Preliminary Human Subjects Study
Previous work observed that CIRL has the potential to out-
perform standard IRL, and achieve value alignment by al-
lowing a robot to exploit pedagogic behavior from humans
(Hadfield-Menell et al., 2016). However, CIRL was only
empirically shown to improve upon the performance of IRL
in theory or, as in our main paper, in simulation. This does
not guarantee that we will observe a similar result in the real
world, where the robot interacts with imperfect humans.
Our goal is to investigate whether the benefits of using CIRL
over IRL in human-robot collaboration tasks carry over to
practice. Here, we conduct a very preliminary investigation
into whether humans behave pedagogically in practice, and
whether a robot trained with CIRL achieves value alignment
more successfully than one trained with IRL.
F.1. Hypotheses
We anticipate that humans will objectively succeed at a col-
laborative task more frequently when collaborating with a
CIRL robot as opposed to an IRL robot, especially when the
task is complex. We also expect that humans will subjec-
tively prefer to work with a CIRL robot instead of an IRL
robot.
H1 - Objective Performance. The type of algorithm used
will positively affect the collaboration objectively across a
range of problem difficulties, with CIRL being better than
IRL.
H2 - Objective Performance in Complex Problems. On
more complex problems, the type of algorithm used will
positively affect the collaboration objectively, with CIRL
being better than IRL.
H3 - Perceptions of the Collaboration. The type of algo-
rithm used will positively affect the participants’ perception
of the collaboration, with CIRL being better than IRL.
F.2. Experimental Design
To explore the effect of the type of robot on human-robot col-
laboration, we conducted a counterbalanced within subjects
study.
F.2.1. EXPERIMENTAL DOMAIN
Participants collaborated with a virtual robot on the cooking
task illustrated briefly in Figure 8 and described extensively
in section 5.1 of the main paper. For this experiment, we
kept the number of ingredients in the domain fixed at 3, and
the length of the horizon fixed at 2.
The robot moved first in this domain. The human was
allowed to observe the robot’s move before selecting her
own move.
Figure 8. We conduct a very preliminary investigation into whether
humans do indeed behave pedagogically in practice and whether,
as a result, CIRL is more effective than IRL for practically achiev-
ing value alignment. Participants collaborated with two robots,
one trained with CIRL and another with IRL, to prepare a specified
recipe, selected from a larger set. Both the participant and robot
were allowed to make a single ingredient at each step but were only
given two steps to complete the recipe; so, the human could not
succeed without the robot’s help. The robot did not know which
recipe the participant was instructed to prepare. Participants there-
fore had to simultaneously teach the robot about their preferred
recipe and make progress toward successfully preparing the recipe.
F.2.2. MANIPULATED VARIABLES
We manipulated two variables in our experiment. The first
was the type of robot used; the two levels were CIRL and
IRL. We henceforth refer to a robot trained with CIRL as a
CIRL-robot and similarly, to a robot trained with IRL as an
IRL-robot.
We additionally wanted to investigate how both robots be-
haved across a variety of problem difficulties. We suspected
that both robots would behave similarly on simple problems
due to the straightforward nature of the tasks but that they
would behave differently on more complex tasks where they
could achieve the goal in a variety of ways. Hence, we
additionally manipulated the number of recipes used in the
task from 2 to 5.
We initially attempted to also vary the length of the horizon
on the collaborative tasks. However, we could only solve
the longer horizon methods with POMCP, an approximate
solver. Hence, there was no guarantee that the solution
computed for these problems would be optimal or would be
of similar quality across various runs. To avoid confounding
the results, we chose to not vary the length of the horizon,
and kept it fixed at 2.
We ran a full (2 by 4) factorial experiment with these two
manipulated variables, leading to a total of 8 conditions.
F.2.3. PROCEDURE
Participants entered the lab and were administered a pre-
study questionnaire. Next, the experimenter explained the
collaborative task and informed participants that they would
be working with two different robots during the course of
the experiment. The experiment was administered virtually
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– the participants did not interact with physical robots.
They performed the task four times (one for each possi-
ble number of recipes) with one robot chosen at random,
and then were administered a questionnaire and asked to
describe the robot they had just worked with. They then
performed the task four more times with the other robot
and were similarly administered a questionnaire. They were
finally administered a post-study questionnaire.
F.2.4. PARTICIPANT ASSIGNMENT METHOD
A total of 12 participants (10 males, 2 females, aged 18-
25) were recruited from the local community. Ten of the
participants reported having a technical background.
The experiment used a within-subjects design because it
enables participants to compare the two robots. They were
informed that one of the robots was a ”student” robot that
expected to be taught, and that the other was an ”observer”
robot that did not expect to be taught but would learn by
watching the human perform the task as best as they could.
They were made aware of which robot was the ”student”
and which was the ”observer”, so that they may behave
accordingly and maximize their chance of succeeding at the
task.
The order of the robot was counterbalanced to control for
order effects. The recipe that participants were instructed to
prepare in each condition was randomly chosen from the set
of possible recipes to eliminate any systematic or familiarity
bias.
F.2.5. DEPENDENT MEASURES
The measures capture the success of a collaboration in both
objective and subjective ways, and are based on Hoffman’s
metrics for fluency in human-robot collaborations (Hoffman,
2013).
The objective measure was success at preparing the desired
recipe. Participants were assigned a score of one when they
succeeded and a score of zero when they failed.
Table 1 shows the six subjective scales that were used, to-
gether with a few forced-choice questions. We did not in-
clude the questions on Safety/Comfort since the participants
did not interact with physical robots. The scales on Robot
Contribution and Trust were shortened to avoid asking par-
ticipants too many questions. The scale on Predictability
was rephrased to more appropriately describe the setup of
the experiment.
Additionally, participants answered forced-choice questions
at the end, about which robot was easier to work with and
which robot they preferred.
Fluency
1. The human-robot team worked fluently together.
2. The robot contributed to the fluency of the team
interaction.
Robot Contribution [shortened]
1. I had to carry the weight to make the human-robot
team better.
2. The robot contributed equally to the team
performance.
3. The robots performance was an important
contribution to the success of the team.
Trust [shortened]
1. I trusted the robot to do the right thing at the right
time.
2. The robot was trustworthy.
Capability
1. I am confident in the robots ability to help me.
2. The robot is intelligent.
Predictability [rephrased for clarity]
1. The robots ingredient selection matched what I
would have expected.
2. The robots ingredient selection was surprising.
Forced-Choice Questions
1. Which robot was the easiest to work with?
2. Which robot do you prefer?
Table 2. Subjective Measures
F.3. Analysis
F.3.1. H1 - OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE
A repeated measures ANOVA on success at preparing the
desired recipe showed that CIRL was only marginally better
than IRL, when measured across all numbers of recipes
(F (1,11) = 3.667, p = 0.08). This offers some evidence in
support of H1.
This is in line with the left plot in Figure 9, which show
the results of the experiment. We see that the CIRL-robot
outperforms the IRL-robot when averaged across all number
of recipes but the improvement is marginal; the error bars
for both algorithms have significant overlap.
F.3.2. H2 - OBJECTIVE PERFORMANCE IN COMPLEX
PROBLEMS
A repeated measures ANOVA on success at preparing the
desired recipe showed that there was a statistically signifi-
cant interaction effect between the algorithm used and the
number of recipes (F (1,11) = 16.18, p = 0.002). A post-
hoc analysis with Tukey HSD revealed that on complex
problems with 5 recipes, CIRL significantly outperformed
IRL, but on simple problem, there was no difference in per-
formance between the two algorithms. This offers strong
evidence for H2.
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Figure 9. The proportion of all trials on which the human-robot team successfully prepared the correct recipe. (Left) Averaged across all
number of recipes: the CIRL-robot only marginally outperforms the IRL-robot. (Right) For each number of recipes: the CIRL-robot only
outperforms the IRL-robot for the most complex experiment (with 5 recipes). In all other experiments, both robots perform similarly.
The right plot on Figure 9 echoes these findings. On prob-
lems with 2, 3, or 4 recipes, the proportion of trials on which
the CIRL-robot and IRL-robot prepared the correct recipe
is very similar. However, on problems with 5 recipes, the
CIRL-robot was much more successful that the IRL-robot
in the collaboration task.
F.3.3. H3 - PERCEPTIONS OF THE COLLABORATION
Scale Cronbach’s α F (1,11) p-value
Fluency 0.84 23.14 <0.001
Robot Contribution 0.69 17.73 0.001
Trust 0.89 16.95 0.002
Capability 0.81 20.07 <0.001
Predictability 0.86 5.189 0.04
Forced-Choice 0.87 6.494 0.03
Table 3. Results of ANOVA on subjective metrics collected from a
7-point Likert-scale survey.
Table 3 shows the results of the experiment. The inter-
nal consistency of each scale is reported via Cronbach’s
α. All scales except one had ”good” consistency, the ex-
ception being robot contribution, whose consistency was
”questionable” with a Cronbach α of 0.69. Scale items were
combined into a score and analyzed with repeated-measures
ANOVAs. Figure 10 plots the results.
The score produced by the overall forced-choice questions
was significantly affected by the type of robot. The CIRL-
robot had a significantly higher score than the IRL-robot
(p = 0.03); it was rated as being easier to work with by 9
of the 12 participants, and was preferred by 10 of the 12
participants. One participant rated the IRL robot as being
easier to work with but preferred to work with the CIRL
robot, remarking that he felt more ”understood” by the CIRL
robot.
All the Likert ratings showed a significant effect for type of
robot as well; the CIRL-robot was rated significantly higher
than the IRL-robot in every case (with p < 0.01 in all but
one case – predictability). The biggest difference between
the two types of robot were in fluency and capability (both
p < 0.001). Several participants described the IRL robot as
”not intelligent”, with one remarking that she felt ”the only
reason we succeeded as much as we did was because some
of the problems were so simple.”
These results offer strong evidence in favor of H3.
F.4. Discussion
We have empirically provided strong evidence that suggests
that, in practice, CIRL is a more effective framework than
IRL for value alignment. In our experiments, participants
were objectively more successful at performing the specified
human-robot collaboration task when working with a CIRL-
robot than with an IRL-robot. Our results further suggest
that CIRL leads to more fluent interaction between human
and robot; our participants broadly preferred working with
the CIRL robot than the IRL robot.
Interestingly, when asked to describe their behavior, many
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Figure 10. Findings for subjective measures.
participants described behaving similarly with both robots.
One participant remarked that regardless of the robot she in-
teracted with, she was ”picking her ingredients to eliminate
the wrong recipes as quickly as possible.”
These remarks agree with the notion that humans tend to
behave pedagogically when working with a learner in prac-
tice. It is then perhaps no surprise that CIRL significantly
outperformed IRL – by exploiting the pedagogic nature of
humans, the CIRL-robot was able to infer more information
more quickly than the IRL-robot was.
F.4.1. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Due to the computational challenges of CIRL (outlined in
the main paper), our experimental domain was still relatively
straightforward. The short horizon nature of our task may
made it easier for participants to behave pedagogically and
questions remain as to whether people will behave similarly
on more complex problems.
Additionally, the demographics of the participants of our
survey were rather skewed toward males from technical
backgrounds. It is entirely possible that people from techni-
cal backgrounds would be more informed about the behavior
of the two robots and therefore able to more successfully col-
laborate with the robots than a non-technical person would.
In future work, we will explore how people behave in col-
laborative tasks over a long horizon, where their desire or
ability to behave pedagogically may be impeded. Further-
more, we intend to deploy our algorithms on real robots
and investigate how humans behave in collaborative tasks
with actual robots as opposed to virtual ones on computer
screens. To do so, we intend to develop a better online solu-
tion method for CIRL with stronger theoretical guarantees
on the quality of the solution, thereby allowing us to solve
larger problems in practice with real individuals.
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